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Abstract—Due to the expectedly higher density of mobile
devices and exhaust of radio resources, the fifth generation (5G)
mobile networks introduce small cell concept in the radio access
technologies, so-called Small Cell Networks (SCNs), to improve
radio spectrum utilization. However, this increases the chance of
handover due to smaller coverage of a micro base station, i.e.,
home eNodeB (HeNB) in 5G. Subsequently, the latency will in-
crease as the costs of authenticated key exchange protocol, which
ensures entity authentication and communication confidentiality
for secure handover, also increase totally. Thus, this work presents
a secure region-based handover scheme (ReHand) with user
anonymity and fast revocation for SCNs in 5G. ReHand greatly
reduces the communication costs when UEs roam between small
cells within the region of a macro base station, i.e., eNB in 5G, and
the computation costs due to the employment of symmetry-based
cryptographic operations. Compared to the three elaborated
related works, ReHand dramatically reduces the costs from
82.92% to 99.99%. Nevertheless, this work demonstrates the
security of ReHand by theoretically formal proofs.
Index Terms—5G mobile communications, Small Cell Network,
Handover, Authentication, Key Exchange, User Anonymity, Ac-
tive Revocation
I. Introduction
F IFTH generation (5G) mobile communication networksplay as a key role in not only communication tech-
nologies, but also the internet-of-things (IoT) technologies.
It has the holistic enhancement in the radio access technolo-
gies (RATs) and communication infrastructures for the new
data/information exchange requirements in IoT. For exam-
ple, millimeter wave, device-to-device communications, and
small cell networks, etc., are to provide better quality of
services (QoS), utilization of radio resource and bandwidth,
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higher transmission rate, and lower latency for various of
emerging applications [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].
To achieve this objective, we need a more efficient network
architecture with robust security to meet the demands of ap-
plication performance in next decade. To meet those demands,
research projects [6], [1], [7] have focused on 5G mobile
communication networks that provide a flexible, reliable, and
high-performance network architecture for wireless commu-
nication beyond 2020. Owing to the upcoming IoT [8] and
the increase in the use of mobile devices [9], a considerably
higher capacity of wireless networks is required. In the future,
connections on the wireless system will increase rapidly and
will be more complex. 5G also emphasizes much lower latency
and higher data rate for users. By decreasing the latency, we
can improve the stability of data transmission and provide real-
time services. Increasing the data rate for each user enables
more advanced applications, such as high-definition (HD)
mobile television (mobile-TV) and mobile clouds.
Several notable technologies have been addressed in 5G,
including support of IPv6, Flat-IP based network, pervasive
networks, power efficiency technology, massive machine-type
communications, and small cell networks, etc [10], [11], [12],
[9], [1], [13], [14], [15]. In recent years, several researches
and technical reports surveyed a wide range of information of
5G [16], [17], [7], [18], [19]. These provided several diverse
collections of 5G features and their own comments. As a
result, 5G is an important future trend in the next decade,
and it will be established in 2020.
Our research focuses on one of these main technical trends,
known as small cell networks (SCNs), a new concept of
infrastructures under the macro cellular coverage [20]. Types
of small cells include femto-, pico-, and micro-cells, which
provide different levels of coverage and abilities. The smallest
cells, i.e., femto cells, have a coverage area of an office,
whereas the pico and micro cells have coverage of a building
and a community, respectively. Macro cells do not communi-
cate with user terminals directly but focus on the management
and connectivity of small cells in an urban scope.
A. Small Cell Networks
The basic architecture of small cell networks in 5G
consists of user equipment (UE), eNodeB/Home eN-
odeB (eNB/HeNB), security gateway (SeGW), home subscribe
server (HSS), and authentication center (AuC) [13], [14], [15].
A UE obtains the communication services via HeNB/eNB
using RATs. Mobility management entity (MME) manages
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2the mobility of UEs by processing the handover requests and
updating the tracking areas of UEs. At the very beginning,
each HeNB has to perform mutual authenticated key exchange
with SeGW for establishing a secure channel among them.
A handover process occurs when a UE changes its visiting
eNB/HeNB when the signal from the connected eNB/HeNB
becomes weaker. When the handover process occurs, the UE
and the new eNB/HeNB should authenticate the mutual legal-
ity and exchange a session key for the following secure com-
munications. For better utilization of radio resources, small
cell technology in 5G deploy more base stations with smaller
coverage, i.e., HeNBs. Compared to the service capacity of
macro cell, each small cell can serve the same number of UEs
in a smaller coverage, so that the density of UEs is enhanced.
Access control in 5G is essential to provide the functions
correctly in the system, i.e., both UE and infrastructure
should be able to identify if the counterpart of each other
is legal or not. Besides, the confidentiality of the subsequent
communications is also required. Generally, access control
and secure communication are guaranteed by authenticated
key exchange (AKE) protocols. The design of AKE in SCN
is more challenging as its performance requirement is more
critical since the latency might increase significantly due to
higher chance of handover caused by the smaller coverage
of radio access networks. Hence, a new design of AKE to
reduce the costs of AKE in handover is necessary to fulfill
the performance requirements of supporting real-time applica-
tions in 5G. Additionally, the user anonymity to conceal the
footprint of communications should be considered to guarantee
privacy as more and more personal and sensitive information
is involved in applications.
B. Related Work
A notable amount of roaming-based AKE protocols have
been proposed and user anonymity has been carefully delib-
erated in [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29],
[30], [31], [32]. In mobile networks, an UE should complete
authentication for identity identification prior to requesting
for services when roaming to the coverage of a new visiting
foreign network (FN). The user anonymous authentication
prevents eavesdroppers or/and FN from exposing the real
identities of UEs in every authentication session such that the
footprints of communications of UEs are concealed.
User anonymity can be separated into two levels, partial user
anonymity and full user anonymity. Partial user anonymous au-
thentication conceals identities from eavesdroppers, excluding
FNs [21], [22], [23] and full user anonymous authentication
additionally considers FNs as eavesdroppers [24], [25], [26],
[27], [28], [30], [31], [32]. With full user anonymity, trace-
ability and revocability are essential to support the permitted
network operators to trace and revoke user identities for
management purposes. Diverse traceability and revocability
techniques [24], [25], [30] have been developed to manage
the anonymity protection in roaming-based mobile networks.
However, in order to provide strong user anonymity, the costs
of revocation and tracing are commonly considerably high
in certain roaming-based AKE schemes. In [32], the system
revokes the users by updating user private keys periodically.
In [31], a time-bound user anonymity AKE is proposed to
reduce the costs of revocation checking by eliminating the
revoked users, whose credentials expire naturally. Overall, the
aforementioned elegant works resolves privacy protection re-
quirements for roaming-based AKE. However, the revocation
and tracing costs for management purposes might be enlarged
for SCNs in 5G. Thus, an efficient design of roaming-based
AKE for secure handover with user anonymity is urgently
required to fit the features of SCNs.
C. Difference between 4G and 5G
There are significant differences between the current 4G and
5G communication networks such as connection principles and
infrastructures. In 4G, the UE should connect to the macro cell
base station, i.e., the eNB, during the handover process to an
adjacent macro cell [33]. Depending on the service area of the
eNB or HeNB, UEs in 4G might connect to the eNB directly
if their signals can be detected by the eNB. UEs can enhance
their connections to the macro cell through relay nodes (RNs),
which are a variation of base stations deployed at the coverage
edge of macro cells in 4G. In this manner, the 4G coverage
can be enhanced.
In 5G, UEs cannot connect to the macro cells directly
because the macro cells do not broadcast beacon frames
anymore. The user terminals in 5G can only connect to the
macro cell via the help of the HeNBs in small cells [33]. The
infrastructure of 5G includes a massive increase in the number
of HeNBs.
Therefore, the operational performance in small cell tech-
nology of the original 4G design is inefficient when it applies
to the new architecture of 5G. Besides, a vulnerable handover
procedure will suffer from the higher risks of impersonation
and eavesdropping attacks due to more infrastructural com-
ponents in 5G. In order to enhance the performance and
guarantee the security of small cell networks in 5G, it is
essential to design a fast handover authentication mechanism,
which is secure, efficient, and tailored to the design principles
of 5G.
Contributions
In this paper, we propose a region-based secure handover
authentication scheme for small cell network in 5G with the
following contributions: 1) the design of region-based fast
authentication reduces the communication and computation
costs without involving the components of core networks when
roaming to a new visiting micro cell within the same region
of a macro cell; 2) user anonymous authentication of roaming
to a new macro cell guarantees identity anonymity against
disclosure of communication footprints; 3) user membership
revocation by accumulated one-way hash eliminates the costs
of managing all revoked users in 5G system; 4) this work
proposes a metrics to evaluate the performance of region-based
fast handover authentication compared to the other related
works; 5) the paper proves the security of the proposed scheme
fulfilling the security definitions by theoretical proofs.
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Fig. 2. The System Model of Small Cell Networks in 5G.
II. System and Security Models
This section introduces the proposed system model, the
security requirements, the security model, the corresponding
security definitions of 5G small cell networks.
A. System Model
This section introduces the system model of small cell
networks, including the proposed security architecture and
mobility, by referring to 3GPP 5G standards [34]. The entire
5G network consists of RAN and evolved packet core (EPC),
also known as core network. In 5G RAN, there are different
types of RANs regarding their transmission coverage, trans-
mission power, service capacity, and application scenario (e.g.,
indoor or outdoor), such as macrocell, microcell, picocell,
and femtocell. Macrocell is the RAN of the largest coverage
supported by eNBs, and microcell, picocell, and femtocell
are the RANs of smaller coverage supported by HeNBs. As
depicted in Fig. 2, a UE may attach to an eNB or HeNB, for
services provided by the core network, i.e., EPC, in mobile
networks. A eNB attaches to EPC directly and HeNB may
attach to an eNB or EPC directly. Before serving the UE, both
UE and EPC have to complete AKE to verify the legitimacy
of both parties and establish a shared session key to secure
the following communications. The entire AKE procedure
involves UE, eNB/HeNB, MME, and HSS/AuC. The UE and
the HSS/AuC shares a common long-term secret key. Hence,
in AKE, the MME will request the HSS/AuC to generate
the required authentication token and verify the authentication
messages from the UE, respectively. The UE can generate
authentication token and verify the authentication messages
from the MME by the shared secret with the HSS/AuC. Once
the AKE is completed, both UE and MME will share the
same secret key material. The MME will also send the derived
session keys to the eNB/HeNB for the subsequent secure
communications with the UE.
Handover. For traditional mobility model to small cell
networks, when the UE roams to a new HeNB, it has to
perform a complete AKE with the components of EPC. This
naturally increases the latency of communications, especially
more handovers in small cell networks. Hence, the mobility
model of the proposed scheme defines a Region, which is
formed by an eNB and its belonging HeNBs. The eNB and
HeNBs within the same region will share the same group
secret key for performing region-based fast handover AKE.
Thus, the entire authentication with MME and HSS/AuC is
required, when the UE roams to a new visiting region. The
UE only need to perform fast handover AKE, when the UE
roams to a HeNB within the visited region without involving
the MME and HSS/AuC.
B. Security Requirements
● Authenticated Key Exchange: Before mobile services,
the 5G security system should ensure identity identifica-
tion through mutual authentication between UE and the
system components in RAN and EPC. Additionally, both
UE and 5G security should be able to exchange a session
key securely to protect the subsequent communications.● Identity Anonymity: The identity anonymity guarantees
that any two communication sessions from the same UE
is unlinkable to any outsider eavesdropper. Hence, the
identity of each UE for every communication session
should be randomized to avoid the traceability of footprint
of communications.● Fast Authentication: In order to enhance the perfor-
mance of authentication, UE performs authentication pro-
tocol with only nearest component, e.g., HeNB, eNB,
etc. It should be able to reduce the latency caused by
the communications with and computation on MME and
HSS/AuC in the core network.● Active/Passive Revocation: Revocation is an essential
function to ensure that the subscription of each UE can
be revoked in case of expiration or suspension of services.
In the proposed 5G security system, the system will issue
a temporary group key for fast authentication when the
UE roams to the coverage of new serving eNB. The
temporary group key can be revoked passively when it is
4expired. The system can also revoke the given temporary
group keys of the user by issuing revocation lists for the
specified eNBs and HeNBs.● Traceability: In order to locate UEs for certain services,
such as incoming calling services and short message
service, the system should be able to identify the location
of each UE even if the anonymous identity is used to
conceal the footprints of communications.
C. Security Definitions
Definition II.1. Matching Conversations [35]
The proposed protocol Π in the presence of an adversary E
and consider two oracles, ΠsA,B and Π
t
B,A, that model two
entities A and B being the partners of each other in the
communication sessions s and t. We say that ΠsA,B and Π
t
B,A
have match conversation if and only if s = t and A and B are
partners.
Definition II.2. No −MatchingE(k) [35]
Let No − MatchingE(k) be the event that there exists
A,B, s, t such that ΠsA,B accepted, but there is no oracle Π
t
B,A
which engaged in a matching conversation under the presence
of a polynomial time adversary E. Note that k is a security
parameter, A,B ∈ I , and s, t ∈ N .
Definition II.3. Secure Mutual Authentication [35]
We say that Π is a secure mutual authentication protocol if
for any polynomial time adversary E,(1) if oracles ΠsA,B and ΠtB,A have matching conversations,
then both oracles accept.(2) the probability of No −MatchingE(k) is negligible.
Definition II.4. DistinguishskE(k) [35]
Let DistinguishskE(k) be the event that an adversary E can
correctly guess that she/he is given the real session key or a
random number after the protocol is performed and terminates
successfully, where k is a security parameter.
Definition II.5. A secure mutual authentication and key ex-
change protocol [35]
A protocol Π is a secure mutual authentication and key
exchange protocol if the following properties are satisfied:
1. Π is a secure mutual authentication protocol.
2. ΠsA,B and Π
t
B,A hold the same session key after running
Π successfully.
3. (Indistinguishability) : (The probability of
DistinguishskE(k) − 12 ) is negligible.
Definition II.6. The game for INDistinguishability under the
Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA) [36]
A challenger ψ and a polynomial time adversary Γ play the
following game with a symmetric cryptosystem Π.● Step 1. ψ runs a setup algorithm. ψ gives Γ the resulting
public parameters params. An encryption oracle Esk and
the decryption oracle Dsk are given a key sk. The above
oracles hold the secret key secretly.● Step 2. Γ issues a sequence of encryption and decryption
queries. Upon receiving an encryption query, denoted by
m∗, ψ returns pi∗ = Esk(m∗) to Γ. Upon receiving a
decryption query, denoted by pi∗, ψ returns ρ∗ =Dsk(pi∗)
to Γ.
Challenge: Γ outputs a plaintext pair (m0,m1). Upon
receiving (m0,m1), ψ randomly chooses θ ∈ {0,1} and
computes the ciphertext pi = Esk(mθ). Then, ψ returns
pi to Γ.● Step 3. Γ issues a sequence of encryption and decryption
queries as those in Step 2 where a restriction here is that
pi∗ ≠ pi.
Guess: Finally, Γ outputs θ′ ∈ {0,1}. If θ′ = θ, Γ will
win the game.
The polynomial time adversary Γ participated in the game
is referred to as an IND-CCA adversary with the guessing
advantage AdvIND−CCAΠ (Γ) = ∣Pr[θ = θ′] − 12 ∣.
Definition II.7. IND-CCA Security
We can say that a symmetric cryptosystem is (t, ε)-IND-
CCA secure if no polynomial time adversary Γ within running
time t, has guessing advantage AdvIND−CCAΠ (Γ) ≥ ε after
performing the game of Definition II.6.
Definition II.8. The game for indistinguishability under
a pseudorandom permutation and a random permutation
(PRP) [37]
A challenger ψ and a polynomial time adversary Γ play the
following game with a pseudorandom permutation Ω.
● Step 1. ψ runs a setup algorithm. ψ gives Γ the resulting
public parameters params. There are two oracles, Ω and
Ω−1, which are the pseudorandom permutation and its
inverse, respectively. Ω can be regarded as an encryption
function and Ω−1 can be regarded as the decryption
function. Ω and Ω−1 know a secret key k. ω and ω−1
are the random permutation and its inverse, respectively.
The random permutation ω is regarded as an encryption
function and ω−1 is regarded as the decryption function.● Step 2. Γ issues a sequence of Ωk and Ω−1k queries. Upon
receiving a Ωk query, denoted by ρ∗, ψ returns pi∗ =
Ωk(ρ∗) to Γ. Upon receiving a Ω−1k query, denoted by
pi∗, ψ returns ρ∗ = Ω−1k (pi∗) to Γ.
Challenge:
Case I: Γ sends a plaintext ρ to ψ with a restriction
that ρ is different from each ρ∗ in Step 2. ψ randomly
chooses θ ∈ {0,1} and computes pi = Ωk(ρ) when θ = 0
or pi = ω(ρ) when θ = 1. Then, ψ returns pi to Γ.
Case II: Γ sends a ciphertext pi to ψ with a restriction
that pi is different from each pi∗ in Step 2. ψ randomly
chooses θ ∈ {0,1} and computes ρ = Ω−1k (pi) when θ = 0
or ρ = ω−1(pi) when θ = 1. Then, ψ returns ρ to Γ.● Step 3. Γ issues a sequence of Ωk and Ω−1k queries as
those in Step 2 where restrictions here are that ρ∗ ≠ ρ
and pi∗ ≠ pi.
Guess: Finally, Γ outputs θ′ ∈ {0,1}. If θ′ = θ, Γ will
win the game.
The polynomial time adversary Γ participated in the game
is referred to as a PRP adversary with the guessing ad-
vantage AdvPRPΩ (Γ) = ∣Pr[ΓΩk,Ω−1k = 1] − Pr[Γω,ω−1 =
1]∣ = ∣Pr[θ′ = θ] − 1
2
∣.
5Definition II.9. Pseudorandom Permutation Security (PRP
Security)
If no polynomial time adversary Γ within running time t, has
the advantage AdvPRPΩ (Γ) ≥ ε after performing the game of
II.8, then the function Ω ∶ KΩ × Z → Z can be considered
as a (t, ε)-secure pseudorandom Permutation [37]. Note that
KΩ is the key space of key k and Z = {0,1}n where n is a
security parameter.
The guessing advantage of Γ is AdvPRPΩ (Γ) =∣Pr[ΓΩk,Ω−1k = 1] − Pr[Γω,ω−1 = 1]∣ = ∣Pr[θ′ = θ] − 1
2
∣. Note
that ω is a random permutation selected uniformly from the
set of all bijections on Z, and k is chosen randomly from the
set of key space KΩ.
Definition II.10. Pseudorandom Function Security (PRF Se-
curity)
If no polynomial time adversary Γ within running time t, has
the advantage AdvPRFΛ (Γ) ≥ ε after performing the game of
II.8, then the function Λ ∶ KΛ × Z → Z can be considered as
a (t, ε)-secure pseudorandom Function [38]. Note that KΛ is
the key space of key k and Z = {0,1}n where n is a security
parameter.
The guessing advantage of Γ is AdvPRFΛ (Γ) = ∣Pr[ΓΛk =
1]−Pr[Γλ,λ−1 = 1]∣ = ∣Pr[θ′ = θ]− 1
2
∣. Note that λ is a random
function selected uniformly from the set of all bijections on
Z, and k is chosen randomly from the set of key space KΛ.
III. Preliminaries
A. One-Way Accumulator
One-way accumulator firstly introduced by J. Benaloh and
M. de Mare in 1993 [39] is a one-way hash function with a
quasi-commutative property for the purpose of testing mem-
bership without the help of a trusted authority.⋆Definition 1: one-way hash function [39]
A family of One −way hash functions is an infinite set of
functions hl ∶Xl × Yl → Zl having the following properties:
1. There exists a polynomial P such that for each integer
l, hl(x, y) is computable in time P (l, ∣x∣, ∣y∣) for all xl ∈
Xl and all yl ∈ Yl.
2. There is no polynomial P such that there exists a
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which, for all
sufficiently large l, will when given l, a pair (x, y) ∈
Xl × Yl, and a y′ ∈ Yl, find an x′ ∈ Xl such that
hl(x, y) = hl(x′, y′) with probability greater than 1/P (l)
when (x, y) is chosen uniformly among all elements of
Xl × Yl and y′ is chosen uniformly form Yl.⋆Definition 2: Quasi-commutativity [39]
A function f ∶X ×Y →X is said to be quasi−commutative
if for all x ∈ X and for all y1, y2 ∈ Y , f(f(x, y1), y2) =
f(f(x, y2), y1).⋆Definition 3: Nyberg’s One-way accumulator [40]
A family of one − way accumulators is a family of one-
way sh functions with quasi-commutativity. The one-way
accumulator by K. Nyberg [40] is constructed based on the
generic symmetry-based hash function (e.g., SHA) and simple
bit-wise operations. Compared to Benaloh’s scheme [39], Ny-
berg’s scheme is more efficient without employing asymmetric
cryptographic operations. Assume that the upper bound to
the number of accumulated items is N = 2d where d is a
positive integer and let one-way hash function h ∶ {0,1}∗ →{0,1}l=r×d, where r is a positive integer. Let x1, x2, ..., xm
be the accumulated items with different string sizes and yi is
the hashing value for each xi, such that {yi = h(xi)}i∈[1,m],
where m ≤ N . yij can be represented as yi = (yi,1, ..., yi,r),
for yij ∈ {0,1}d and j = 1, ..., r. Next, we replace yi,j by a
single bit. If yi,j is a string comprised of d 0s, it is replaced
by 0. Otherwise, yi,j is replaced by 1. Since there are r
substrings of yi,j , yi can be mapped to a string bi{0,1}r,
such that bi = (bi,1, bi,2, ..., bi,r) = α(yi) = α(h(xi)). The
bi,j denotes the jth bit of bi and the probability of bi,j = 0
is 2−d. In this way, we can transfer an accumulated item xi
to a bit string bi of length r which can be considered as
a value of r independent binary random variable if h is an
ideal hash function. Let HNyb() denote Nyberg’s fast one-
way hash function and ⊙ be the bitwise operation AND.
The accumulated function on an accumulated item X with
an accumulated key K can be described as HNyb(K,X) =
K ⊙ α(Y ) = K ⊙ α(h(X)). And it also can be described as
Z =HNyb(K,X) =K⊙α(yi) =K⊙α(h(xi)) for i = 1, ...,m
if X is a set of accumulated items X = (x1, x2, ..., xm).
As the bitwise operation AND obeys the commutativity rule,
the quasi-commutativity of HNyb() can be achieved and
HNyb(HNyb(K,x1), x2) =HNyb(HNyb(K,x2), x1). On the
other hand, the operation AND as a logic multiplication
operation also has the property of absorbency, which can be
expressed as "A ⊙ A = A ". Hence, HNyb(HNyb(K,xi), xi) =
K ⊙ α(h(xi)) = HNyb(K,xi). To verify the membership
of an item xi on the accumulated value Z expressed as(a1, a2, ..., ar), compute bi = α(h(xi)) corresponding to
bi = (bi,1, bi,2, ..., bi,r) and check that whenever bi,j = 0 then
aj = 0 for all j = 1, ..., r. Using the property of absorbency,
one can verify whether an item xi within the accumulated
value Z by HNyb(Z,xi) = Z ⊙ α(h(xi)) = Z. The security
proof of Nyberg’s one-way accumulator [40] is based on the
availability of a long, truly random hash code which provides
strong one-wayness property. In other words, it can be proven
secure in the Random Oracle Model [41], [42].
IV. Proposed Scheme
The proposed region-based fast authentication introduces
the concept of regional warrants, where each region is formed
by the coverage of a macro cell, which includes one eNB
and several belonging HeNBs. A UE will be issued a re-
gional warrant when visiting a new region and completing the
Initial Handover protocol. When the UE roams to another
HeNB within the same region, the region-based fast handover
authentication will be performed with the assistant of MME
and HSS/AuC. Hence, the fast handover authentication greatly
reduces the communication latency. Our protocol also provides
an active revocation function such that the operator can revoke
UE’s warrant actively when the membership of UE is changed.
. The notations used in our protocols are shown in Table I.
6A. Overview and Key Management
The proposed scheme contains five phases, Initializa-
tion, Registration, Initial Handover, Region-based Fast
Handover, and Active Revocation. First, the Initializa-
tion phase introduces the initialization of the parameters of
macro cells (eNB), small cells (HeNBs), the MME, and the
HSS/AuC. The Registration phase presents the procedures of
registering a new UE joining with its identity and security
information in the mobile network. How a user joins a new
visiting region and gets a warrant, which is generated by the
eNB of the region, are shown in the Initial Handover phase.
The Region-based Fast Handover phase presents that how a
UE and the visiting HeNB authenticate each other when the
user moves from one small cell to another. Finally, we present
an active revocation function in the Active Revocation phase.
Let the region covered by eNB be the macro cell, the regions
covered by HeNBs be the small cells, and UEs be the mobile
user terminals. Table II the variables of key management in
the proposed ReHand scheme.
TABLE I
Notations
Notation Meaning
GKi group key of the eNB i and the belonging HeNBs
IDi identity of UE i
pIDi, rIDi anonymous identity of UE i
T IDij anonymous identity of UE i for region j
bRIj blind factor of anonymizing identity
Ex(y) using a symmetric encryption function to encryptmessage y with key x
Dx(y) using a symmetric decryption function to decryptmessage y with key x
Ki shared long-term secret key between UE i and HSS/AuC
d one-time key between UE i and HSS/AuC
Dij
region secret key shared between UE i and the region
covered by the eNB j and its belonging HeNBs.
RStj
the accumulated value of the revocation list for the
region j in time slot St
HNyb Nyberg’s fast one-way hash function
H,F one-way hash functions
Tex timestamp of warrant’s expiration time⊙ bitwise operation AND
TABLE II
Key Management in ReHand
UE eNB&HeNBs of region j HSS/AuC
Ki, Dij GKj {Dij}i∈[1,N],{GKj}j∈[1,M]
TIDij R
St
j {Ki}i∈[1,N],{rIDi}i∈[1,N]
pIDi {bRIj}I∈[1,k] KH ,{pIDi}i∈[1,N]
B. Initialization
This phase produces the required parameters as follows:
- Step 1: In order to form a region of fast handover,
the HSS/AuC issues a group key GKj , blind factors{bRIj}I∈[1,k] for identity anonymization, to each eNB j
and its belonging HeNBs.
- Step 2: The HSS/AuC issues a long-term secret key Ki for
each UE i as the shared long-term secret between them.
It also selects an anonymous identity rIDi and computes
pIDi = EKH (rIDi) for each UE i.
- Step 3: The HSS/AuC prepares a revocation list RStj for
each region j in time slot St, where the region secret
keys of the revoked UEs are accumulated by Nyberg’s
accumulated hash function. RStj is empty initially.
C. Registration
UE i registers to the system securely and share the private
parameters with the HSS/AuC.
- Step 1: UE i registers to the system with the identity infor-
mation IDi and the registration required information.
- Step 2: The HSS/AuC issues IDi, rIDi, pIDi, and Ki to
the registered UE i and records (IDi, rIDi, pIDi) in its
database.
In practical situations, a mobile user should contact with
the system operator in person before consuming the service.
The mobile user will be issued a SIM card, which is temper-
resistant and stores the personal identity and secret, i.e.,IDi,
and Ki, for her/his mobile device.
D. Initial Handover
When a UE i roams to the coverage of a new HeNB
belonging to a newly visiting eNB j, it should process the
following steps to get a timeliness warrant from the system.
The UE i can, therefore, access the network by running the
region-based handover process with each HeNB in the same
coverage of the eNB with the warrant until it expires.
In order to preserve identity privacy, the real identity IDi of
UE i should be hidden during transferring data. The HSS/AuC
and eNBs/HeNBs take pIDi as a label so that they can
extract the corresponding Ki and rIDi for the following
authentication and key exchange.
- Step 1: UE i chooses a one-time key d at random and sends{pIDi,C1 = EKi(pIDi, d)} to the new visiting HeNB.
- Step 2: When the HeNB received {pIDi,C1}, it forwards
them to the MME through the eNB. Once the MME
received (pIDi,C1), it sends them to HSS/AuC for
authentication.
- Step 3: After receiving the messages from the MME,
the HSS/AuC first retrieves Ki by the correspond-
ing rIDi = DKH (pIDi) and d by decrypting C1
with Ki. The HSS/AuC then checks if the decrypted
pIDi is equal to the pIDi sent by the UE i. It
then selects a new anonymous identity rIDi (re-
place the original rIDi with it) and I ∈ {1, k},
computes TIDij = {λ = rIDi ⊕ bRIj}, computes
pID∗i = EKH (rIDi), Dij = H(GKj , rIDi, Tex), C2 =
EKi(TIDij ,Dij , Tex, d, pID∗i ), CK = H(d, pID∗i ),
KM,i = F (CK), keeps the session key, CK, shared with
the UE i, and sends {C2,KM,i} back to the MME.
- Step 4: After receiving the messages from the HSS/AuC,
the MME computes the session key, KeN,i = F (KM,i),
shared with the eNB and the UE i, and sends {C2,KeN,i}
back to eNB. The eNB keeps KeN,i and sends the session
key, KHe,i = F (KeN,i), shared with the UE i. Finally,
7both eNB and HeNB share KeN,i and KHe with the UE i,
respectively, for the subsequent secure communications.
Afterward, the HeNB sends C2 to UE i.
- Step 5: Upon the receipt of the messages from the
HeNB, the UE i extracts {TIDij ,Dij , Tex, d, pID∗i }
by decrypting C2 with Ki. It then replaces pIDi =
pID∗i , updates TIDij , and computes the session keys
shared with the HSS/AuC, MME, eNB, and HeNB
by CK = H(d, rID∗i ),KM,i = F (CK),KeN,i =
F (KM,i),KHe,i = F (KeN,i).
After the initial handover phase, the visiting region j of
the UE i will be recorded by the MME. The UE i will
share Dij and pIDi, which will be updated for every initial
handover session, with the HSS/AuC. If any UE i is revoked,
the HSS/AuC will update RStj by R
St
j =HNyb(RStj ,Dij) and
send to the HeNBs and the eNB of the region j.
E. Region-based Fast Handover
When UE i moves from one HeNB to a new HeNB within
the same region j, it needs to run the region-based handover
authentication. How UE i and the HeNB authenticate each
other securely and exchange a session key is described as
follows.
- Step 0: The HSS/AuC updates RStj for the revoked Dij in
the previous time epoch St−1 and send it with the proof
σj = H(GKj ,RStj ) to the HeNB in the region j at the
beginning of St. Once receiving {RStj , σj}, the HeNB
check the correctness with GKj by σj
?=H(GKj ,RStj ).
- Step 1: The UE i sends {TIDij , ru, Tex} to the HeNB in
the region j.
- Step 2: Upon the receipt of the messages from UE i, the
HeNB extracts bRIj by I and computes trID = λ⊕ bRIj
and computes D′ij =H(trID,GKj , Tex). It then checks
RStj
?= HNyb(RStj ,D′ij) and Tcur − Tex ?< θ. If so,
the HeNB selects a nonce rh, and computes the shared
session key KHe,i = H(D′ij , ru, rh) and the response
δ = H(D′ij , ru, rh,KHe,i). It also computes TID′ij =
t_rID ⊕ bRI′j by selecting a new I ′ ≠ I in [1, k] and
C = EDij(TID′ij , I ′). The HeNB sends δ, rh,C to the
UE i.
- Step 3: Afterward, the UE i computes KHe,i =
H(Dij , ru, rh) and checks if δ ?= H(Dij , ru, rh,KHe,i).
If so, the UE i computes δ′ = H(KHe,i , rh),{TIDij , I ′} = DDij(C), and replaces TIDij = TID′ij
and I = I ′. The UE i then sends δ′ to the HeNB.
- Step 4: Upon the receipt of δ′, the HeNB checks if δ′ =
H(KHe,i , rh). If it holds, the UE i is legal and accepted.
If the protocol is completed, both UE i and the HeNB are legal
and accept each other. The handover protocol is also illustrated
in Fig. 4.
F. Active Revocation
This phase shows the procedure of revoking a UE in the
system. When the system revokes the membership of a UE,
the HSS/AuC can revoke the issued warrant and long-term
secret key as the following.
- Step 1: The system operator provides IDi of the revoked
UE i to the HSS/AuC. The HSS/AuC will check all the
temporarily anonymous identities and the corresponding
warrants unexpired and issued for the UE i.
- Step 2: The HSS/AuC revokes the unexpired warrants by
updating the RStj =HNyb(RStj ,Dij) of each region j for
time epoch St with its message authentication code σj =
H(GKj ,RStj ). The HSS/AuC then sends each updated{RStj , σj} to its belonging region.
- Step 3: Each HeNB will verify if the UE is revoked or not
by the operations indicated in Step 2 of Region-based
Fast Handover.
G. Management of User Warrants and Revocation Lists
Fig. 5 illustrates the setting of time slots for the update
of revocation list of each macro cell region. The HSS/AuC
generates the accumulated value RStj as the revocation list
for macro cell region j in each time slot St for all t ∈ N.
Each RStj contains the Dij of all revoked UEs in the region
j. For example, Alice, Bob, and Charles get their warrants at
t0, t1, t4, respectively. Assume that all warrants are only valid
for one time slot, the warrants of Alice, Bob, and Charles
will expire at t2, t3, t5, respectively. If the warrants of Alice
and Bob are actively revoked before the expiration times t2, t3
and within S0, their warrants will be accumulated into RS0j .
If the active revocation time is before t2 and t3, and within
S1, the issuing time of RS1j is after t2 and t3. Hence, the
HSS/AuC needs not to accumulate the warrants of Alice and
Bob into RS1j since the warrantes will be revoked passively
by the expiration times.
Similarly, if the warrant of Charles is actively revoked
before the expiration times t5 and within S1, the warrant of
Charles should be accumulated into the revocation list RS1j .
Otherwise, Charles’s warrant will be expired passively after
t5. The revocation list of each region in every time slot will
be produced by the HSS/AuC and sent to the corresponding
region for the active revocation of all the unexpired warrants.
Security of Shared Group Key. The eNB and HeNBs in the
same region j share the same group key GKj for the region-
based fast handover authentication. Any eNB or HeNB may
be accessed physically by adversaries, who intend to retrieve
GKj and impersonate a legal UE i by computing a forged
Dij in the region j. The system operator can prevent this
kind of attacks by adopting trust platform modular (TPM) or
Trust Execution Environment (TEE) [43], which are popular
technologies to protect secret keys and compute the related
cryptographic operations with the secret keys in dedicated
hardware chipset. Additionally, even if the adversary has GKj ,
she/he cannot pass the region-based fast handover authenti-
cation as it requires to send out the correct pID∗i , which
will be renewed after every communication session. pID∗i is
considered as additional secret shared among the UE i and
eNB/HeNB in the region j. Hence, the proposed ReHand
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pIDi, C1 = EKi(pIDi, d) pIDi, C1
Extract Ki by pIDi and
(rIDi, d) by decrypting C1 and pIDi
C2
Extract TIDij , Dij , Tex, d, pID
∗
i by
Decrypting C2 with Ki.
Replace pIDi = pID
∗
i and
TIDij .
CK = H(d, pID∗i )
C2,KM,i
CK = H(d, pID∗i )
Region i
UE i
KM,i = F (CK)
KeN,i = F (KM,i)
C2,KeN,i
C2,KHe,i
KHe,i = F (KeN,i)
KM,i = F (CK)
KeN,i = F (KM,i)
KHe,i = F (KeN,i)
Dij = H(GKj , rIDi, Tex)
C2 = EKi(TIDij , Dij , Tex, d, pID
∗
i )
Select rIDi, I ∈ {1, k} and
compute TIDij = {λ = rIDi ⊕ bRIj , I}
pID∗i = EKH (rIDi)
Fig. 3. Initial authentication for entering the coverage of a new attaching eNB
Compute D′ij = H(t rID,GKj , Tex) and
check RStj
?
= RStj ⊙HNyb(D′ij)
Compute KHe,i = H(D
′
ij , ru, rh)
δ = H(D′ij , ru, rh,KHe,i)
δ, rh, C
Compute KHe,i = H(Dij , ru, rh) and
Check if δ
?
= H(Dij , ru, rh,KHe,i)
Compute δ′ = H(KHe,i, rh)
δ′
Check if δ′ = H(KHe,i, rh)
UE i HeNB in Region j eNB HSS/AuCMME
Send {RStj ,σj = H(GKj , RStj )} in
the beginning of every time epoch St
TIDij , ru, Tex
t rID = λ⊕ bRIj
TID′ij = t rID ⊕ bRI
′
j for I
′ "= I
C = EDij (TID
′
ij , I
′)
Decrypt {TID′ij , I ′} = DDij (C)
Replace TIDij = TID
′
ij , I = I
′
Fig. 4. Region-based Handover phase
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Fig. 5. Analysis of the revocation list
achieves the security of shared group key against key exposure
attacks.
Practical User Anonymity in Mobile Network. Many prior
arts have shown their solutions [28], [31] for user anonymous
authentication in mobile networks, where the footprint of
communication sessions of UE is unlinkable. In the 3GPP
standards of mobile networks, each UE has to complete the
attachment to the new visiting serving networks with the
assistance of the belonging MME and HSS/AuC so that the
mobile service provider of the UE can locate its area in case of
an incoming voice call. The above two works adopt group sig-
natures [44], [45], [46], [47] to achieve strong user anonymity
by which the recipient of the authentication information, made
by group signatures with the issued group signing key of
distinct user, can only verify the legitimacy by the group public
key. That is, only the legal users can produce the valid group
signatures on the selected messages by the group signing keys
issued from the trust authority. However, strong anonymity
causes the impossibility of tracing the location of UEs and
results in the failure of incoming voice call service and short
message service (SMS). Thus, AKE protocols with strong user
anonymity only check the legitimacy of UEs without knowing
the exact identity information for services. For the mobile
network services requiring the exact identity information to
respond the incoming call, which is exactly for the specified
UE, the system should supports traceability for conditional
user anonymity.
Revocation Costs for User Anonymity. User revocation to
anonymous AKE is essential to the membership management
for accountability in mobile networks. Even if the strong
user anonymity can achieve identity untraceability against
system operators, the revocation of unsubscribed users should
get effected to ensure the accountability. The operations of
revocation should be considered as parts of operations in AKE.
Hence, the costs evaluation of AKE should include revocation
costs in practice.
V. Security Analysis
A. Security Analysis of Initial Handover
Theorem V.1. The proposed mutual authentication and key
exchange protocol Π with user anonymity for the Initial
Handover phase is secure based on the IND-CCA security of
the underlying pseudorandom function and the pseudorandom
permutation.
Lemma V.1 (Mutual Authentication in Initial Handover).
The proposed protocol Π in the Initial Handover phase is
a secure mutual authentication protocol for UE i and the
system (including HeNB, eNB, MME, and HSS/AuC) under
the assumption that the underlying pseudorandom permutation
Ω is with PRP security.
Proof. Assume that ε is the probability of breaking the mutual
authentication security of Π by a probabilistic polynomial time
adversary E with the simulator Γ, who simulates Π and plays
the game in Definition II.6 to break the PRP security. Γ
interacts with E by simulating either UE i or the system with
9the given (Ω,Ω−1) by a challenger ψ . It is either a pair of a
pseudorandom permutation and its inverse, i.e., (EKi ,DKi),
or a truly random permutation and its inverse, i.e., (ω,ω−1).
Γ simulates Π by the following oracle functions to capture the
capability of E, where A denotes the UE and B denotes the
system in Π.
- Execute(ΠsA,B ,ΠtB,A): This oracle models the execution
of Π and outputs the transcripts of the execution. In order
to perform the protocol Π correctly, Γ simulates ΠsA,B
and ΠtB,A by querying Ω and Ω
−1 for the encryption of
given messages and the decryption of given ciphertexts.
Hence, Γ can simulate Π as described in Fig.3 success-
fully.
- Send(ΠsA,B ,m): This oracle models the capability of
active attackers, who sends the message m to ΠsA,B . If
m = {C2}, ΠsA,B will decrypt it by Ω−1 to check if the
format {rID∗i ,Dij , Tex} is correct or not. If so, the oracle
outputs accept to accept this session, it outputs reject to
reject this session.
- Send(ΠtB,A,m): If m = {pIDi,C1}, ΠtB,A will decrypt
C1 by Ω−1 to extract pIDi and d. If the format of
the extracted {rID,d} is correct, ΠtB,A computes C2 =
Ω(TIDij ,Dij , Tex, d, pID∗i ) by the given Ω and output
C2.
Challenge: Before the challenge phase, Γ can query Ω
and Ω−1 with the polynomial number of messages as in-
puts and receive the corresponding outputs for the train-
ing besides the training in the above protocol simulation.
Then, Γ sends a chosen message ρ = {pIDi, d} or ρ ={TIDij ,Dij , Tex, d, pID∗i }, which are the messages in the
simulation of executing Π with E, to ψ and ψ randomly
chooses a bit θ ∈ {0,1}. If θ = 0, then ψ encrypts ρ by Ω;
otherwise, ψ encrypts ρ by ω. ψ outputs pi to Γ.
Guess: If E can send out {pIDi,C1} or {C2} correctly
by acting as a legal UE or system, , Γ will output θ′ = θ;
otherwise Γ will output θ′ ∈ {0,1} randomly.
When θ = 0, the above experiment is a real experiment and
E has additional advantage to break the mutual authentication
of Π. When θ = 1, the above experiment is a random
experiment and E has no advantage to break the mutual
authentication of Π. Thus, Γ can only exploit the advantage
ε of breaking the mutual authentication of Π by E to break
the security of PRP, i.e., EKi and DKi . τ is the probability
of breaking (EKi ,DKi). Hence, we have the following.
τ≥Pr[θ′ = θ] − 1
2
= ε + 1
2
(1 − ε) − 1
2
= ε
2
(1)
Since τ is negligible based on the assumption of PRP security,
ε is also negligible. Hence, the probability of breaking the
mutual authentication of Π in member join phase is negligi-
ble.
Lemma V.2 (Key Exchange in Initial Handover). The pro-
posed protocol in the Initial Handover phase is a secure key
exchange protocol Π if the adopted underlying pseudorandom
function Λ is with PRF security.
Proof. Assume that ε is the probability of breaking the key
exchange security of Π by E with the simulator Γ, who
simulates Π and plays the game in Definition II.6 to break
the PRF security. Γ interacts with E by simulating either UE
i or the system with the given Λ. It is either a pseudorandom
function, i.e., H(d, .), or a truly random permutation, i.e.,
λ, according to a random bit θ ∈ {0,1}. Γ simulates Π by
the following oracle functions to capture the capability of E,
where A denotes the UE and B denotes the system in Π.
- Execute(ΠsA,B ,ΠtB,A): In order to perform the protocol
Π correctly, ΠsA,B and Π
t
B,A can query Λ for the keying
hash of given messages.
- Send(ΠsA,B ,m): This oracle can decrypt C1 and output
the corresponding C2 successfully since Ki is selected
by Γ.
- Send(ΠtB,A,m): This oracle can generate C1 and de-
crypt C2 successfully since Ki is selected by Γ.
- Reveal(ΠsA,B): This oracle outputs the session key held
by ΠsA,B .
- Reveal(ΠtB,A): This oracle outputs the session key held
by ΠtB,A.
- Test(ΠsA,B): When E makes a Test query to ΠsA,B ,
ΠsA,B responds a real session key CK, which is produced
by querying Λ with pID∗i or a random string α. Note that
this query is valid only when the real session key is not
revealed.
- Test(ΠtB,A): When E makes a Test query to ΠtB,A,
ΠtB,A responds a real session key CK, which is produced
by querying Λ with rID∗i or a random string as the
corresponding answer K. Note that this query is valid
only when the real session key is not revealed.
Challenge: Before the challenge phase, Gamma can query
Λ with polynomial number of messages as inputs and receive
the corresponding outputs for the training beside the training
in the above protocol simulation. Then, Γ sends pID∗i to ψ
and ψ randomly chooses a bit θ ∈ {0,1}. If θ = 0, ψ computes
pID∗i by H(d, .); otherwise, ψ computes pID∗i by λ.
Guess: If neither ΠsA,B nor Π
t
B,A receives the Test query,
Γ will output θˆ ∈ {0,1} at random. Otherwise, if E queries
Test to ΠsA,B or Π
t
B,A, Γ will select a random bit θ ∈ {0,1}
and respond CK to E if θˆ = 0. Otherwise, Γ responds α to
E if θˆ = 1. Then, E outputs θˆ′ = 0 if it guesses the received
output of Test query is the real session key. Otherwise, E
outputs θˆ′ = 1. When θ = 0, the above experiment is a real
experiment and E has additional advantage  to break the key
exchange security of Π. When θ = 1, the experiment is a
random experiment and E has no advantage to break the key
exchange security of Π. Hence, if θˆ = θˆ′, Γ will output θ = 0.
Otherwise, Γ outputs θ = 0 or 1 randomly.
τ is the probability of breaking the PRF security of H(d, .).
From the above, we have that
τ ≥ Pr[θ′ = θ] − 1
2
= ε + 1
2
(1 − ε) − 1
2
= ε
2
. (2)
Thus, the probability, ε, of event DistinguishCK(k) of the
constructed session key CK by an adversary E is negligible
since τ is also negligible based on the PRF security assump-
tion.
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Lemma V.3 (User Anonymity in Initial Handover). The
proposed protocol Π in the Initial Handover phase is with
user anonymity if the adopted underlying pseudorandom per-
mutation Ω is with PRP security.
Proof. Assume that ε is the probability of breaking the user
anonymity of Π by E with the simulator Γ, who simulates
Π and plays the game in Definition II.6 to break the PRP
security. Γ interacts with E by simulating either UE i or the
system with the given Λ. It is either a pseudorandom function,
i.e., H(d, .), or a truly random permutation, i.e., λ, according
to a random bit θ ∈ {0,1}. Γ simulates Π by Send, Execute,
Reveal, and Test to capture the capability of E, which are
the same as that in Lemma V.2. Besides that, Γ additionally
simulate the following oracles.
- RevealID(ΠsA,B): This oracle reveals the new anony-
mous identity rID∗i held by ΠsA,B .
- RevealID(ΠtB,A): This oracle reveals rID∗i held by
ΠtB,A.
- TestID(ΠsA,B): This oracle responds a real rID∗i or a
random strong depending on the random bit selected by
Γ.
Challenge: Γ computes C2 with {TIDij ,Dij , Tex, d, pID∗i }
by Ω. Ω given by ψ is Hk for θ = 0 or a random permutation
ω for θ = 1. Guess: If E output can guess out the given string
is a real pID∗i or a random string after querying TestID, then
Γ will output θ = 0. Otherwise, Γ outputs θ ∈ {0,1} randomly.
E has additional advantage to break user anonymity when Ω
is a pseudorandom permutation (Ek), i.e., θ = 0. When Ω
is a random permutation, E has no advantage to break user
anonymity. Hence, we have that
τ ≥ Pr[θ′ = θ] − 1
2
= ε + 1
2
(1 − ε) − 1
2
= ε
2
. (3)
τ is negligible based on PRP security assumption. Hence, the
probability of breaking user anonymity ε is also negligible.
According to Lemma V.1 Lemma V.2, and Lemma V.3 ,
Theorem V.1 holds.
B. Security Analysis of Region-based Fast Handover
Theorem V.2. The proposed mutual authentication and key
exchange protocol Π′ with user anonymity for the Region-
based Fast Handover phase of the proposed scheme is secure
based on the PRF security.
Lemma V.4. The proposed protocol Π′ in the Region-based
Fast Handover phase is a secure mutual authentication pro-
tocol for UE i and the HeNB under the assumption that the
underlying pseudorandom function Λ′1 and Λ′2 are with PRF
security.
Proof. Γ simulates Π′ with the given Λ′ = {Λ′1,Λ′2} by ψ,
where Λ′1 = H(D′ij , ., ., .) and Λ′2 = H(KHe,i, .) for θ = 0,
or Λ′1 and Λ′2 are the random functions λ′1 and λ′2 for θ = 1.
Then, Γ can simulate Π by the oracle functions, Execute and
Send, to capture the capability of E, which are the same as
that in the proof of Lemma V.1. In Challenge phase, Γ will
send the message {ru, rh,KHe,i} or rh to Λ′1 or Λ′2 for the
corresponding output, δ or δ′.
In Guess phase, Γ outputs θ′ = 0 if E outputs the correct δ
or δ′ successfully. Otherwise, Γ outputs θ′ ∈ {0,1} randomly.
When θ = 0, the above experiment is a real experiment and E
has additional probability ε′ to break the mutual authentication
security of Π′. When θ = 1, the experiment is a random
experiment and E has negligible probability to break mutual
authentication security. Hence, we have that
τ ′1 ≥ Pr[θ = θ′] = ε + 12(1 − ε) − 12 = ε2 . (4)
τ ′2 ≥ Pr[θ = θ′] = ε′ + 12(1 − ε′) − 12 = ε′2 . (5)
τ ′1 + τ ′2 ≥ ε+ε′2 . (6)
τ ′1 is the probability of breaking the PRF security of
H(D′ij , ., ., .), τ ′2 is the probability of breaking the PRF
security of H(KHe,i, .), ε is the probability of breaking the
mutual authentication security by sending the correct δ, and
ε′ is the probability of breaking the mutual authentication
security by sending the correct δ′.
Lemma V.5. The proposed protocol Π′ in the Region-based
Fast Handover phase is a secure key exchange protocol
for UE i and the HeNB under the assumption that the the
underlying pseudorandom function Λ′ is with PRF security.
Proof. Assume that ε is the advantage of breaking the key
exchange of Π′ by E. Γ simulates Π′ with the given Λ by
ψ, where Λ = H(Dij , .) if θ = 0; otherwise, Λ is a random
function. Then, Γ can simulate Π′ by the oracle functions,
Execute, Send, Reveal, and Test to capture the capability
of E, which are the same as that in the proof of Lemma V.5.
In Challenge phase, Γ will send the message {ru, rh} to Λ
for the corresponding output KHe,i.
In Guess phase, Γ will output θ = 0 or θ = 1 randomly if
E does not query Test. If E query Test, Γ will respond a
real session key KHe,i for θˆ = 0. Otherwise, Γ will respond a
random string α. Γ outputs θ = 0 if E outputs θˆ′ = θˆ correctly.
Otherwise, Γ outputs θ = 0 or 1 randomly. Hence, we have
that
τ ≥ Pr[θ′ = θ] − 1
2
= ε + 1
2
(1 − ε) − 1
2
= ε
2
. (7)
τ is the probability of breaking the PRF security of H(Dij , .).
 is negligible since τ is also negligible. Therefore, Π′
guarantees key exchange security based on the PRF security
assumption.
Lemma V.6. The proposed protocol Π in the Region-based
Fast Handover phase is with user anonymity if k > a× b− b,
where k is the number of {bRIj}I∈[1,k], b is the number of UEs
within the region j, and a is the number of communication
sessions launched by a UE in average.
Proof. The region-based fast handover guarantees the user
anonymity by TIDij = rIDij ⊕ bRIj . Since the number of
sessions launched by a UE is a and the number of UEs within
a region is b, there will be (a × b) tuples of TIDij collected
by adversaries. If the number of bRIk is k > a × b − b, the
system should be able to guarantee that (k + b) > a × b.
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That is, the number of variables, including the anonymous
identities of UEs and the blind factors, are always more than
the equations provided by TIDij’s. Hence, there should be no
only solution for each anonymous identity for adversaries to
link the communication sessions to any specific UE. Hence,
the region-based fast handover ensures user anonymity.
VI. Comparisons
This section compares the performance in communication
and computation costs of ReHand with the three prior arts [28],
[31], [32], which are also with mutual authentication, session
key exchange, user anonymity, conditional traceability, and
active revocation for the security requirements of roaming-
based AKE in 5G.
A. Computation and Communication Costs
We evaluate the computation/communication costs of the
proposed ReHand protocols with the other roaming-based
authentication protocols [28], [31], [32] on a smartphone of
ASUS Zenfone 3 as a UE testbed. The smartphone runs
Android 8.0.0 mobile operating system and is equipped with
2.0 GHz octa-core ARM Cortex-A53 CPU and 3GB RAM.
The cryptographic libraries for the implementation of the
required cryptographic operations in the proposed scheme
and the related works are java pairing based cryptography
(JPBC) [48] and Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) [49].
The evaluation also run the above cryptographic libraries on
a APPLE Macbook Pro (2016 model) with 2.9 GHz dual-
core Intel Core i5 CPU and 8GB RAM for the estimation of
computation costs. Table III shows the total computation cost
and the communication costs of the proposed schemes with
the three related works [28], [31], [32], and the definitions
of the computation times of all operations and the message
lengths of all variables.
Regarding the message lengths, the length of an element
from G1 is 170 bits and from GT is 340 bits for the pairing
mapping by MNT curves [50] for 80 bits security. The key
lengths, LK , of the symmetry-based encryption (i.e., Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard, AES), keyed hash function (i.e.,
Secure Hash Algorithm 2, SHA-2), and their outputs are 128
bits. The lengths of an identity and nonce used in AKE
protocol are also 128 bits for the consistency.
In order to evaluate the communication costs among the pro-
posed scheme and the other prior arts empirically, we assume
that the eNB/HeNB as visiting authentication node (VAN),
which is the closest authentication node to UE, and the
HSS/AuC as home authentication node (HAN), which is
the authentication node of the belonging home network of
UE. Without loss of generality for communication costs, Cα
denotes the communication time of a unit (i.e., 512-bit as
a minimum data frame) between UE and VAN. Cβ denotes
the communication time of a unit between VAN and HAN.
Since the communication cost between eNB and HeNB is
extremely low as the wired X2 interface is used between them.
Besides, the performance metrics define the rate of roaming
to a HeNB in a new visiting region as αR and the rate of
roaming to a HeNB in a visited region as (1−αR) to estimate
the effect of handover on the performance by time of the
proposed protocols, i.e., Initial Handover and Region-based
Handover. In the testbed of the communication evaluation, an
WiFi access point (AP) of D-Link DIR-612 N300 with a laptop
of APPLE Macbook Pro (2016 model) emulates eNB/HeNB,
and two guest operating systems (OSs) of Debian/Linux 9
on the virtual machine of Google Cloud Platform Computer
Engine emulate VAN and HAN, respectively. By running
each communication experiment for 10,000 times, Cα is 4.36
millisecond (ms) and Cβ is 261.76 ms.
B. Revocation Costs
Revocation check is essential to verify the legality of
the membership in the system and considered as a part of
authentication. Hence, the costs of revocation check should be
evaluated in the performance comparison. Since the revocation
list can be updated for every fixed period to reduce the
size, the size of revocation list is defined as ∣RLt∣. For the
proposed scheme, the size of the revocation list in a region
j at the specific period St is defined as ∣RLStj ∣. In order to
compare the performance unbiased, we also assume that the
revocation lists are updated periodically in the other related
works [28], [31], [32]. In [31], the revocation list cannot be
updated for only specific period of times. Hence, we denote
the size of the complete revocation list as ∣RL∣. Nevertheless,
the communication costs are also affected by the update
frequency of revocation list. Thus, we define the period of
updating revocation list as TRL and the frequency as 1TRL . The
performance evaluation will take the above defined variables
related to revocation check into account.
C. Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate the effect of roaming to a new region
on the performance, the time latency of the proposed protocol
is TH−AKE = αR × TI−AKE + (1 − αR) × TF−AKE, where
TI−AKE is the time of Initial Handover and TF−AKE is the
time of Region-based Fast Handover.
In this evaluation, we assume that the number of revoked
UEs is 1,000,000 1, the period of updating revocation lists (i.e.,
TRL) is from 60 seconds to 3,600 seconds (1 hour), the range
of speed, v, of UE is from 0 to 500 kilometer per hour (KM/h),
and the diameter, r, of eNB is 2 KMs. Here, the expiration
time, Texp, of each warrant is the same as TRL in ReHand.
αR is affected by the expiration of the warrant and roaming
to a new eNB region and defined as
αR = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1
Texp
+ v
r×3,600 , if αR < 1
1, otherwise.
(8)
Based on the given v ∈ [0,500] KM/h, r = 2 KMs, and Texp ∈[60,3600], the range of αR is from 2.78×10−4 to 8.6×10−2.
Figure 6 shows the performance comparison (computation and
communication costs) of the proposed ReHand scheme with
1According to the statistics reports from National Communication Com-
mission (NCC) Taiwan, the number of base stations (eNB), NeNB , is 22,000
and the number of revoked subscribers (i.e., ∣RL∣) is around 1,000,000 in the
major telecommunication company, Chunghwa Telecom.
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TABLE III
Comparisons on Computation and Communication Costs
Computation Costs
UE System User Tracing (on System) Revocation Costs (onSystem)
CPAL [28] 3Te + 10Tme Te + 7Tme + Tp 4Tme + 2Tp 4∣RLt∣ ⋅ Tm + ∣RLt∣ ⋅(Tme + Te) + TInv
Time-bound Auth [31] 49Te + 8Tp 46Te + 6Tp ∣RL∣ ⋅ Te ∣RL∣ ⋅ Te
HashHand [32] TpH + TH + Tp TpH + 2TH + Tp TpH + TH + Tp N/A
Our scheme (ReHand) αR ⋅ (2TSE + 4TH) + (1 −
αR) ⋅ 3TH αR ⋅ (2TSE + 5TH) + (1 −αR) ⋅ 5TH 0 ∣RLStj ∣ ⋅ TH
Communication Costs (per authentication)
CPAL {Cα × (15LG +LT )} + { 1TRL × (Cα +Cβ) ×LG} + (Cβ × 3LG)
Time-bound Auth Cα × {(11LG + 13Lp +LID +LH) + 2LG}
HashHand {Cα × (2LID +LN + 2LH)} + {Cβ × (2LID +LN +LH)}
Our Scheme (ReHand)
αR × {Cα × (3LID + 3LK +LT ) +Cβ × (3LID + 4LK +LT )}+(1 −αR) × {Cα × (LID + 2LH + 2LN +LT ) + 1TRL ×Cβ × ∣RLStj ∣ ×LHNyb}
TSE : the computation time of symmetry-based encryption/decryption (AES)(with an input of 128-bit)
TH : the computation time of one-way hash function (SHA-256)(with an input of 128-bit)
Te: the computation time of exponential operation in G
Tm: the computation time of multiplicative operation
Tp: the computation time of pairing operation
Tme: the computation time of multi-exponential operation in G
TpH : the computation time of hash-to-point operation in ({0,1}∗ → G)
TInv : the computation time of inverse operation in G
The computation costs on UE side:
TSE = 6.8 × 10−3ms, TH=0.006 ms, Te=TInv=70.1 ms, Tp=135.5 ms, Tme = 1.5Te = 105.15 ms, TpH = 10.2 ms.
The computation costs on system side:
Te=TInv= 9.505 ms, Tm=9.556 ms, Tp= 5.065ms, Tme = 1.5Te = 14.257 ms, TpH = 1.413 ms.
LID : the length of an identity (128-bit)
LH : the length of a hash (SHA-256) output
LG: the length of an element in G
Lp: the length of an element in Zp (p is a prime)
LN : the length of a nonce
LK : the length of a symmetry-based secret key
LT : the length of timestamp
L
HNyb
: the length of a Nyberg one-way accumulate hash containing one item
LID = LN = LH = LK = 128 bits, LG = 170 bits, Lp = 171 bits, LT = 64 bits, LHNyb (per 10 accumulated items) = 722.33 bits, LHNyb (per 100
accumulated items) = 1444.66 bits
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Fig. 6. Performance Comparisons
the three prior arts [28], [31], [32], the ReHand greatly reduces
the cost to 82.92% compared with HashHand scheme [32]
when TRL ≥ 240 (i.e., ≥ 2 minutes), to 99.99% compared
with Time-bound scheme [31], and to 99.95% compared with
CPAL scheme [28].
VII. Conclusion
This work proposes a region-based secure fast handover
framework that is not only tailored to the technical direction of
small cell network in 5G, but also combines the properties of
secure mutual authentication, privacy preservation, computa-
tion efficiency, and functional active revocation. The proposed
authentication framework adopts the techniques of group key,
one-time identity, and accumulated one-way hash, so that
every authentication within the same region only involve
UE and the visiting HeNB. We also provide formal security
analysis to demonstrate the proposed security scheme is secure
based on the cryptographic hard problems. Compared to the
other works, the proposed scheme eliminates considerable
computation and communication costs for small cell networks
in 5G.
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